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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

- - - - - - - - - - - ::~:JJAHIN

-------

AMADOR,

Appellant,
-vs "!TARTMr,NT

I Sf:CURITY
:)F

UTAH,

Case No. 12059
(~F

E:MPLOYMSNT

L'lF THE

~~TA TE

Respondent.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

This is an appeal from a decision of the Department
of Employment Security, denying appellant unemployment

benefits and ordering appellant to repay $1,326.00 for
: .1hich appellant was allegedly not legally elibible.
I

DISPOSITION OF CASE BELON

By final decision dated March 18, 1970, the Board of
,~eview

i

affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee

:ated January 6, 1970, denying appellant's claim for
:nemployment benefits for certain weeks and ordering
1

:ppellant to repay moneys received for said weeks in
:he total amount of $1,326. 00.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the
=s::i-s.rtrr.<::nt of Employment Security that appellant was
:'lerpaid in the amount of $1,326.00, it being appellant's
.~cntention

that he was fully entitled to receive all of

said amount.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The facts are not in controversy.
. is

The only issue

as to what facts are material and what legal con-

clusions are to be drawn from the facts.
It is undisputed that for the weeks ending March 29,
i

April 12 through May 3, and May 17 through October 14,
1969, appellant's wife signed his weekly

claims

1
I

for benefits.

(R. 31)

It is also agreed that appellant

received a total of $1,326.00 in benefits pursuant to
,·said claims.

I

1

I
I

1

(R. 33)

It is true, as found by the

Referee, that the form upon which appellant's claims
were submitted states:
3IGNED BY THE CLAIMANT."

"THIS CLAIM MUST BE PERSONALLY
(R. 31)

Admittedly, there was

''nothing physically or mentally that prevented the
'laimant from signing his own weekly claim forms each

1

11eek during the period in question."
-2-

(R. 32)
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On the other hand, there is nothing anywhere in

the'

l't"CC1rd

i.1'JY

!1l1

te1 suggost that appellant was ever in any

tifi\.:'d tlMt his failure personally to sign his

claims might result not only in denial of benefits
~ut

also in his being required to repay benefits

for which he had not personally signed.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that
'

I

appellant was not in fact fully entitled to unemployment
benefits for each of the weeks in question.

The Board

, :if Review recognized the validity of that assertion

rn its statement that "had these claims been filed by
, tlK'

\.:'laimant, this Board would have been constrained

I t1' l't'mand the matter back to the Appeals Referee for
the taking of additional testimony on the question of
the availability of the claimant."

(R. 6)

On December 23, 1969, appellant and his wife
appeared before the Referee and were examined by him,
·mcter oath, extensively and without objection or
:nterference by appellant's counsel who was present
i
I

3t the hearing.

i

rR. 14-30) makes abundantly clear that the weekly

A reading of the 16 pages of testimony

I

· ~laims signed by appellant's wife were factually correct .

I

:md honestly made by her, and that Mrs. Amador had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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:~en

speaking the simple truth in an earlier written

5t~tement

taken from her by the Department on October

"My husband, the above named, signed his
claims for the week ending March 8, March
15, March 22, and April 5, 1969.
nAs his wife (Frances) I have signed all
other claims for him. That is, I would
complete the claim and sign his name to
the card.
nr really didn't think it mattered very
much. He was in town all the time. I
just started signing them all and that's
all there was to it.
nwe didn't intend any fraud by it. He
was available for work all the time. He
received and endorsed all the warrants."
(R. 17 -18)

At the outset of the hearing before the Referee
on December 23, 1969, counsel appeared with appellant
and clearly stated his legal position, inviting the
1

Referee to examine appellant and his wife on the

' merits:
n(Mr. Young)

Now if this were a case, and that
is why Mr. Amador is here to answer
questions about it, if this were
a case where his failure to personally sign cards was related
to a desire by him to avoid responsibility for statements which
were made, then in such a case
this regulation would be reasonable.
I can see that it may serve a
reasonable purpose, but we are
saying -- applied to this particulart
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case where Mr. Amador has nothing
to hide, and is here to testify,
as well as his wife, under oath
about the facts, the representation:
that were made under his signaturethat in this situation, that the
regulation is contrary to the
purpose of the statute • • • And
that is our legal position, and
Mr. Amador is here to speak fully
and frankly under oath about the
circumstances during the period
in question, and whether there is
anything that might disqualify
him from benefits. But we feel
that the facts were accurately
stated. The fact that Mrs. Amador
admittedly signed his name on some
of these cards during this period
does not alter the question
whether, on the facts, he was
entitled to the benefits.
)
"Referee

"Mr. Young

Do you want to question Mr. Amador
further on this point, or do you
want me to proceed and get the
information I would like?
Perhaps if you would just go
ahead." (R. 16)

The Referee's subsequent examination of appellant

)

and his wife corroborated that appellant was eligible
for benefits during the weeks his wife signed the
claims:
"Referee

Now have those as a general rule,
rather than putting it down for
every time, as a general rule,
those that you did sign on the
weekly claims themselves, did you
i
comolete the reverse side of them
as to the information concerning
availability and general informatio1
about the claimant?
d
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c::

.. Mrs. Amador

Yes.

"Referee

Did you make a point of sitting
down and talking with your husband
concerning this matter, or is it
just the fact that you as a general
rule assumed you knew what your
husband was doing when you complete(
these?

"Mrs. Amador

Well, I knew what he was doing.
I didn't have to question him.

"Referee

Some of these questions, for
example, ask: 'I refused work,
if yes explain below,' 'I failed
to apply for work after being
notified,' 'I was self-employed,'
'I was attending school,' 'I traveled away from home,' a question in
regards to other benefits received,
and 'I now have a steady job.'
Those are the basic questions asked
on the reverse side. Is that
correct?

11

Mrs. 7\mador

Yes, that is right.

"Referee

And you felt that you had sufficient
knowledge to answer these questions,
is that what you are telling me?

''Mrs. Amador

Yes."

"Referee

You have been present during the
testimony of your wife, is that
correct?

"Mr. Amador

Yes, I have.

"Referee

You have had occasion to look at
the claims that she was looking
-6-

(R. 19)
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at at the time, these weekly claims,
at the time she was going through
them, is that correct?
"Mr. Amador

Yes.

"Referee

Is there anything in her testimony
that you do not agree with?

"Mr. Amci.dor

No, there isn't.

"Referee

To your knowledge, what she has
testified to would be correct then?

"Mr. Amador

Yes.

"Referee

Mr. Young, would you like to pursue
any further in regards to a couple
of statements made in your appeal?

"Mr. Young

Yes. Mr. Amador, did you--were you
aware that your wife was making out
these claim cards each week when
she did so? Were you aware that
she was?

TT

Mr. J\nk1dor

Yes,

I

was.

"Mr. Young

All right. And were you--was this
with your consent?

"Mr. Amador

Yes, it was." (R. 23)

"Mr. Young

Mr. Amador, to the best your knowledge, were the factual statements
that your wife signed to on these
cards correct? Did she state the
correct facts? And if you are not
sure, would you like to look at
the cards?

TT

Mr. Amador

No, she put the right facts.
-7-
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"Mr. Young

TT

Mr• Amador

nMr. Young
11

Mr. Amador

Did she know your employment
situation and whether or not
you were working'?
Oh, yes.
She was living with you all this
time?
I hope she was.

''Mr. Young

Do you feel she was acting on your
behalf when she did this?

nMr. Amador

Yes, uh-huh.

TT

Mr. Young

"Mr. Amador

To your

knowledge~

Yes. 11 (R. 24)

Following the foregoing examination of appellant
and his wife, the Referee separated the witnesses (R. 11)
and examined each with the other excluded from the room.

Similar questions were asked about their backgrounds
and activities.

The Referee picked up a discrepancy

with regard to a very recent job opportunity (which was
~relevant

to any of the weekly claims here in dispute)

Which appellant had not mentioned but his wife recalled.
TT

Referee

• . . Mr. Amador, for your information, I have been asking your wife
very similar questions to those I
asked you while you were in here,
the employers you contacted, and
what she recalls concerning this.
For your infonnation, she might
happen to make a statement on it,
she indicated that you had contacted
Central City to her knowledge
several times during the past month.
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Does this recall to your mind that
that was possibly so?
n Mr.

Amador

Yes, uh-huh.

"R"'.::feree

Is there any reason why you didn't
refer that to me at the time,
because I asked you the same
question?

TTMr. Amador

Well, at the time, I mean it--does
this have anything to do with this
here decision?

"R~=>ferec

Yes. For the record, what I am
trying to find out, see, you told
me, or said in effect, that your
wife knows what you are doing,
and that she is able to complete
these forms each week.

"Mr. Amador

Oh, yes, she is more informed about
it than I am, as far as that goes.
I guess the last time I talked to
them was just about four or five
days ago, about a week ago I was
talking to them seeing about workin~
down there. Down at Central City
there is a director down there, you
know. It would be just part time,
of course. It would be at night,
taking care of the place.

"Referee

I have no further questions.
(R. 2 9)

. . ."

We might add that Mr. Amador's statement about his
1vife being better informed than he was is understandable,
in view of the fact that she was a B student in school

(R. 15) whereas Mr. Amador was unable to do satisfactory
Work beyond the sixth grade level but was given passing
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grades to keep him eligible for athletics until he
dropped out in the eleventh grade at West High.

(R. 20-

21)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEPARTMENTTS DECISION ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETS UCA 35-4-6(d) AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY
TC~ Tiff PURPOSE OF THE WORJ<MANT S COMPENSATION

l\C' T.

The Department's decision in this case presents a
simple question of law:

Assuming that a claimant for

workman Ts compensation was otherwise entitled to unemployment benefits and was paid such benefits, may he
be required to repay the state for such benefits if it

appears that he did not personally sign his claim form
pursuant to a statement on the form saying only: "THIS
\'LAIM MUST BE PERSONALLY SIGNED BY THE CLAIMANTn?

First of all, it should be noted that the form says
nothing about the possible consequences of having an
agent sign the form for the claimant.
form at R. 42.)

(See copies of

The form does inform the claimant that

''the law provides penalties for false statements." (R. 42
~owever,

there is no serious suggestion anywhere in the

record that appellant or his wife made any false state-

ment of fact which might be relevant or material to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

r1Y

p1...'r d1.'tcrmin,1tion of his eligibility for unemploy-

ment benefits.

The record is devoid of any facts which

might controvert the sworn testimony of appellant and
his wife that he was in fact eligible for all of the
benefits received.
There is nothing in the language of UCA 35-4-6(d)
to suggest a legislative intent to deprive an unemployed
man of benefits retroactively on the ground that he
didnTt follow all of the instructions on an application

T1...1 the contrary,

TT

This court has repeatedly held

that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally
construed to effectuate its purposes, and where there is
doubt, it should be resolved in favor of coverage of
the employee. TT

Jones v. California Packing Corp.,

121 Utah 612, 615, 244 P.2d 640 (1952).

The purposes of the Act have been authoritatively
stated by this court in the leading case of Singer
~wing

Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission.

104 Utah 175, 134 P.2d 479 (1943):

"(a) The Unemployment Compensation Law
was enacted under and as an exercise of the
police power of the state.
-11-
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(b) Its purpose is remedial to protect the health, morals, and welfare of
the people by providing a cushion against
the shocks and rigors of unemployment.
!!

TT (c) Being remedial under the police
power and not imposing limitations on
basic rights, it should be liberally
construed.TT

104 Utah at 18 9.
Rather than resolving doubts in favor of the
unemployed claimant or ''providing a cushion against
the shocks and rigors of unemployment, TT the Department
h,:is

sei:=ed upon a technicality of its own devising to

,Jcny appellant benefits to which he was clearly entitled.
\vt~

believe the Department's position is diametrically

opposed to the purposes of the Workman's Compensation
Act as interpreted repeatedly by this court.

POINT II
THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION IS SO ARBITRARY
AND UNREASONABLE AS TO CONSTITUTE A DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The state has suffered no pecuniary loss which can
be rationally related to appellant's failure personally

to sign his weekly claims.

There is no question but

that appellant was entitled to the benefits paid to

him; the record establishes that the claims signed by
his wife were factual and correct.

Appellant and his
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wife intended no fraud upon the state, and in fact no
fraud occurred.

Yet the Department takes the position

that because appellant permitted his wife to sign the
claim forms, appellant (who at the time of the hearings
was still unemployed) must repay more than $1,300.00 to
the state.
We have not as yet been cited a regulation which
supports the n0partment' s position.
t,)

The closest thing

regulation is the statement on the claim form

Slh.'h ,l

which says:

"THIS CLAIM MUST BE PERSONALLY SIGNED BY

THE CLAIMANT."

(R. 42)

The form does not go on to

explain the consequences of noncompliance with that
statement, any more than it says what will happen if
the claimant disregards similar statements that he is
to sign
SPACE. n

TT

In ink" or that he must

TT

NOT WRITE IN THIS

(See R. 42. )

We do not question the utility or reasonableness
of each of the instructions on the claims form.

They

undoubtedly serve useful functions in the processing
of claims.

The question is whether innocent noncom-

pliance with certain instructions justifies the
Department in pursuing such a harsh, punitive course
of action against appellant.

We believe that the
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';e:partmentr s position in this case is unauthorized by
:t~tute

and is so arbitrary and capricious as to

,;onsti tute a denial of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
3nd under Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah State Consti tu ti on.

CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Board of Review and of the
Appeals referee should be reversed with instructions
to reinstate appellant's benefits for the weeks ending

March 29, April 12 through May 3, and May 17 through

October 4, 1969, representating a total amount of
$1,326.00.

Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD L. YOONG
College of Law
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
Attorney for Appellant
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